Perceptions of corruption tend to be lower where female political representation is higher (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001) , but the mechanism behind this pattern remains uncertain. Female politicians may have fewer opportunities to participate in corruption as they are excluded from predominantly male networks (Bjarnegård 2013 ). Women in politics may also be more highly-qualified (Anzia and Berry 2011) , more risk-averse (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer forthcoming), or more opposed in principle to corruption (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001) .
We focus on a further mechanism suggested by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (forthcoming) : female politicians in high-accountability contexts may be less corrupt because they believe they are more likely to be held accountable by voters. We assess whether this belief is accurate: Is it true that female politicians are more heavily punished for comparable levels of misconduct? If so, is this due to differences in how men and women evaluate female politicians' records, as suggested by the work of Jones (2014)? We address these questions with a vignette experiment in the UK.
Our point of departure is gender stereotyping of politicians. One widely accepted view is that men are seen as more agentic, i.e. competent and assertive, and women as more communal, i.e. compassionate, warm and emotional (Dolan 2004) . Women are also seen as more honest than men (Dolan 2014b; Fridkin, Kenney, and Woodall 2009; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Kahn 1992) . Consistent with this, voters who value honesty are more likely to vote for women than for men (Dolan 2004; Frederick and Streb 2008) .
1
These gender stereotypes imply that voters respond differently to misconduct by male and female politicians. In the absence of evidence of misconduct, voters who view women as more honest would support a female politician more than an otherwise-similar male politician. The flip-side of this stereotyping is that female politicians have "further to fall" if wrongdoing is revealed: to the extent that female politicians' support draws more on voters who are attracted to perceived integrity, their support stands to suffer more when 1 The persistence of gender stereotypes stands in contrast to the weak to nonexistent penalty for female candidates at the ballot box (Dolan 2014a ). This discrepancy may exist because female politicians are generally of higher quality and because voters face multiple considerations in addition to candidate gender. a lack of integrity is found (Funk 1996: p. 18 ).
2 Our first hypothesis is therefore: female politicians are punished more severely than male politicians for equivalent misconduct (H1).
Turning to the gender of voters, women have been found to on average be tougher on corruption (Alatas et al. 2009; Eckel and Grossman 1996) , perhaps because they value honesty and integrity more. Our second hypothesis is thus: women punish misconduct more severely than men (H2).
Finally, the difference between male and female voters' behavior could depend on whether the politician is male or female. If female voters care more about corruption, and/or adhere more to gender stereotypes portraying female politicians as honest, then the stronger punishment for female politicians may come disproportionately from female voters. (For example, the "further to fall" hypothesis may apply only to female voters.)
Alternatively, following Jones (2014), female voters might punish female politicians more because they are more engaged when evaluating female rather than male politicians. In either case, the higher aggregate punishment of female politicians might originate with female voters. Our third hypothesis is: women punish female politicians more severely for misconduct than men (H3).
3

Experimental design
We use a population-based survey experiment similar to choice-based conjoint analysis (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014) . To our knowledge, our experiment is the first to consider how politician and voter gender affect punishment for corruption 2 Formally, denote by x g,c the support level of a politician of gender g ∈ {m, f } (where m is male, and f is female) given observed misconduct c ∈ {0, 1}. The claim is that In an observational study, it would be difficult to determine whether differences in how voters respond to misconduct by male and female MPs are due to hard-to-measure characteristics (such as the severity of misconduct or the nature of local political preferences) that may vary with MP gender. Different responses to comparable misconduct In our experiment, the conduct and gender of the MP are, by design, unrelated to the political context and respondent characteristics, as is the information about MPs and their conduct. Thus, although differences in voter responses to similar behaviour by male and female MPs could in general be related to differences in the information voters receive about male and female MPs' behaviour or to voters' gender biases (or both), our experiment focuses only on the latter channel.
Our survey experiment cannot replicate real-world vote choice, but we try to maintain external validity in two ways. First, we present respondents with a multidimensional, reasonably realistic choice setting. This should also reduce social desirability bias, as respondents can justify their vote based on a number of considerations (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014) . Second, we primed respondents to think about partisan considerations rather than MP gender or conduct in office by displaying party logos in the choice tasks and including an introductory screen that characterized general elections as opportunities to select a national government (see Appendix A). Model 1 shows that corrupt MPs are penalized: the probability of choosing the incumbent MP is 24 percentage points lower for 'bad' than for 'good' MPs. Model 1 also
Results
shows that female incumbents in general are not less likely to be supported and that female voters are about as likely to vote for the incumbent as men. Model 2 shows little support for H1: female politicians are not punished significantly more for wrongdoing than male politicians. The probability of voting for a male politician is 23 percentage points lower on average if the MP engaged in misconduct. This punishment is only 2 percentage points larger for female politicians, and the difference in effects is not statistically significant.
Model 3 shows that, consistent with H2, female respondents punish MP misconduct more harshly (by over 5 percentage points) than male respondents. While this echoes a finding in Esarey and Chirillo (2013) , the differential punishment by gender we detect cannot be attributed to differences in the extent to which male and female voters are aware of MP misconduct. helps to explain why we find no difference in punishment of female and male MPs (H1):
female voters appear to punish female MPs more than male MPs, but male voters if anything punish them less.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that voters on average punish misconduct similarly among male and female politicians. If female politicians do face greater accountability, this is probably not because voters treat female politicians more harshly. Yet, our findings leave open the possibility that voters are more aware of misconduct by female politicians (e.g. Larcinese and Sircar 2017) or perceive similar behaviour by men and women differently. Our findings also suggest that female voters are more responsive to corruption among female than among male politicians, in particular because women react more to good behaviour by female politicians. This provides the first experimental evidence that men and women differ in how they hold male and female politicians accountable for misconduct.
Would similar effects be found in a real UK election? While we used a representative sample and included strong incumbency and party cues and a weak gender cue, our effects might be biased upwards if our participants reacted to key attributes more strongly than they would in a real election. Would similar effects would be found in other 
C Results with controls
The regression models reported in Table 1 
D Robustness to more extensive controls
In the main paper we find that female voters on average punish incumbent misconduct more than male voters, and that this difference is particularly pronounced when the incumbent is female rather than male. While MP misconduct and MP gender are randomly assigned treatments in our experiment, voter gender is of course not. Furthermore, even the models from Table C .1 of the Appendix C control only for the main effects of other voter characteristics. Therefore, one may wonder whether the observed differences in treatment effects among male and female voters could be attributable to some other respondent variable that co-varies with respondent gender in our sample.
To examine whether this might be the case, we re-estimated Models 6 and 8 from Note: OLS models. Dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent votes for the incumbent MP (1) or not (0). Voter characteristic controls are gender, age group (25-39, 40-59, 60 and above), social grade (AB or C1 vs C2 or DE) and indicators for whether the respondent identifies with the incumbents' party, the challenger's party, or some other party (vs no reported party identification). Incumbent and challenger characteristic controls are incumbent and challenger gender, age and previous occupation and party match-up in vignette (Conservative vs Labour, Labour vs Conservative, Conservative vs Lib Dem, Labour vs Lib Dem). Standard errors clustered by respondent. * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01.
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E First choice task versus all choice tasks
The regression models reported in Table 1 of the main text are estimated based on respondents' choices in all five choice tasks. To check that our results are not an artefact of respondent learning as they progress through choice tasks, we re-estimate each model on data from respondents' first choice task only. Tables E.1 and E.2 show the results for each model specification in the first-task subsample and the full sample, without and with controls, respectively. Comparing each pair of Models (e.g., Models 7 and 8), it is clear that subsetting to data from the first choice task generally yields little change in the direction and magnitude of coefficient point estimates, although standard errors are substantially increased due to the substantial reduction in sample size. The one exception is Model 8 in Table E .1, which shows different patterns than Model 7; note, however, that in the Models with controls in Table E .2, the patterns for the first task and all tasks remain very similar. Note: OLS models run on observations from respondents' first choice task only (odd-numbered models) or observations from all choice tasks (even-numbered models). Dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent votes for the incumbent MP (1) or not (0). For models run on data from all choice tasks, standard errors clustered by respondent. For models run on data from respondents' first choice task only, standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3). * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01. 
F Conditioning effects of challenger gender
Here we present evidence on how challenger gender interacts with voter and incumbent gender in shaping reactions to misconduct. It could be that having two main candidates who are women increases the attention that women pay to the political situation, or that women respond to the female-only contests differently because they can hold the female incumbent accountable without sacrificing another potential goal, namely increasing substantive representation through having a female MP.
To examine these possibilities we divide the sample into male and female respondents, then for each sub-sample estimate a regression model of incumbent voting that includes a three-way interaction between MP conduct, MP gender and the gender of the main challenger. We thus allow for the interaction between MP misconduct, MP gender and challenger gender to vary for male and female respondents. Based on the models with controls, Figure F .1 compares the marginal effects of MP misconduct across varying combinations of MP, challenger and respondent gender. There is some suggestive evidence in Figure F .1 that female voters (bottom panel) punish misbehaving female MPs more than misbehaving male MPs to a greater extent when the main challenger is also female. According to the p-value on the three-way interaction term in Model 4 of Table F.1 this difference is significant at the 0.1 level. In contrast, for male voters (top panel) there is less of a difference in punishment for misconduct regardless of MP or challenger gender.
In sum, we find some tentative evidence that, among female voters, the difference in punishment of male and female politicians may be more pronounced when the main challenger is also female.
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